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Diplomats, academics and other foreign policy experts who visit the U.S. are often struck 
by the quality and size of the foreign policy community.  This community includes 
government officials from numerous departments and agencies, members of congress and 
their staff, NGO leaders and activists, scholars, bloggers, journalists, diplomats and 
others.  There is a great deal of expertise and, protestations from some ideological 
quarters notwithstanding, a significant amount of substantive breadth to this community 
with vibrant, well-informed debates occurring on most issues. 
It is, therefore, even more puzzling and upsetting that such a smart, large and vibrant 
community of foreign policy experts consistently produces such uncreative frequently, 
unsuccessful and often dysfunctional policies, leading to an expensive network of 
military bases, poorly thought out wars, diminished leverage will both allies and 
adversaries and failure to take meaningful leadership on issues of global import such as 
climate change.  U.S. foreign policy is trapped by the illogic of its bureaucracy, an 
unwillingness to disaggregate what is desirable from what is possible and a view of the 
U.S. role in the world that is not only inaccurate, but so deeply held that it is rarely 
seriously challenged even in an otherwise very deliberative foreign policy community. 
The network of military bases and large and politically powerful defense community 
makes it almost impossible to consider a foreign policy that is more modest or to view a 
problem in any part of the world as not our own.  More precisely, it makes it very easy to 
create a rationale for continued U.S. presence and involvement almost anywhere.  Almost 
every country is either home to a base, next to a country with a base or part of some kind 
of strategic transportation network, at least according to the logic of this 
bureaucracy.  Once this is accepted, the path to a global American presence is much less 
obstructed.  In a less direct way, the presence of foreign policy communities working on 
most parts of the world creates a similar bureaucratic logic for continued American 
involvement in these regions and for overstating the strategic relevance of these regions 
or issues.  Nobody can build a career by admitting that the issue or area they study, while 
fascinating, just isn’t that important from Washington’s perspective. 
Similarly, too much of the debate about various foreign policy questions focus on what 
the U.S. should do, rather than what we can do.  A truly wise foreign policy would, of 
course, focus on both.  Disaggregating these questions is particularly difficult because it 
requires both recognizing the limits of American power, but also, at least in the short 
term, conceding that some people will continue to suffer, be oppressed or even be 
killed.  For example, clearly it very desirable for the U.S. to do something to alleviate the 
conditions of starvation and oppression under which the people of North Korea live, but 
there is very little we can do about that.  North Korea is one of the few cases where there 
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is agreement on the limits of American power.  Similar questions should lay at the center 
of numerous current debates, not least the war in Afghanistan. 
Conflating what the U.S. would like to do with what it can do is intertwined with the 
view that permeates American foreign policy that the U.S. has a unique role in the world 
that allows us, or even requires us, to seek to solve problems across the globe.   This view 
is shared throughout the foreign policy elite, and is probably a defining characteristic of 
the foreign policy community.  If your view is that the U.S. is just another country with 
its own interests and problems that should probably just take care of its own needs and 
otherwise mind its own business, you will spend your career on the outside of the foreign 
policy community looking in.  This was not always the case as there have been strong 
isolationist elements for better and worse among the foreign policy leadership for much 
of American history, but not so much anymore.  Today, the bipartisan consensus, at least 
at the elite level, around an internationalist foreign policy is strong and the belief in 
America’s unique ability and obligation to be involved in problems and issues across the 
globe almost universal in this elite. 
These factors contribute to a foreign policy community that while largely populated by 
diverse, smart and committed people, as well as of course, a handful of ideologues, 
people out only for themselves and their careers, or who may not be so bright, is largely 
dysfunctional.  The foreign policy community in the U.S. is very good at analyzing 
problems, proposing solutions within a given policy bandwidth, even implementing these 
policies.  However, it is not as good at looking at bigger picture questions and proposing, 
or even entertaining significant shifts in American foreign policy.  This makes it difficult 
to consciously make major decisions so that U.S. foreign policy is, at least in the big 
picture, troublingly reactive.  For example, the evolution of the U.S. into something of a 
21st century empire was never discussed or debated, it just happened, more or less due to 
entropy.  This is not the way empires should be built, or more significantly, how they can 
ever be walked back once they have been created. As the world moves back to becoming 
multi-polar, the U.S. will have to rethink much of its foreign policy, while the intellect 
and ability is there, the structural constraints will make this difficult. 
